FleXam: Implementing Security Applications in OpenFlow Controller



ARBOR

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Hotl 2013 – San Jose, CA

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Anti-Outline

- First, what this paper is not about:
 - Unlike what the title might suggest, the focus of this work is not security!
- What is it about then?
 - Simple observation
 - Simple question
 - Simple extension to OpenFlow
 - Simple example as a case study


To Summarize: The paper is not about *security*; and, it is very *simple*! ©

FleXam: Imp


Observation

- It might be desirable to implement security (or similar) services as SDN controller applications
 - Works for some (e.g. small) networks
 - Can reduce cost and complexity
- Need packet level information
 - Botnet detection: connection patterns, packet contents
 - Port scan detection: packet header, inter-arrival times
 - Worm detection: packet contents

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Controller Information Channels



Packet Level Information in OpenFlow

- Lack of packet level information is not intrinsic in SDN
 - But a side-effect of how OpenFlow works

- OpenFlow is mainly designed to deal with flows rather than individual packets
- Still, we can access packet level information to some extent.

Packet Level Information in OpenFlow

- Option 1: Do not install flow rule
 - Every packet of the flow will be sent to the controller
- Option 2: Divert packets to a monitoring device
 Suggested in original OpenFlow white paper

Limitations ...

- Option 1: install no rule
 - Controller sits on the packet delivery path
 - Potential bottleneck
 - Increased packet delivery times
 - Switch may buffer the packet
 - Only parts of each packet may reach the controller
- Option 2: divert traffic to monitoring device
 - High network overhead
 - Unnecessary overhead
 - E.g. need packet header, receive full packet
 - Complex monitors required
 - Increased network cost and complexity

A Question

- Existing information channels either
 - Provide no packet level information
 - Need to relay all packets


Question: Is there a simple mechanism to create a tunable channel for packet level information?

FleXam: Flexible Sampling in OpenFlow

- Per-flow sampling as a new information channel
 - Gives the controller access to packet-level information
- The controller defines
 - Which flows need to be sampled
 - Inside a given flow how samples are selected
 - What part of each packet is selected
 - Where the samples are sent to
- Simple, yet flexible
 - ... for different applications


Stochastic Sampling in FleXam

• Select each packet with a fixed probability of *p* and forward to the control plane



Deterministic Sampling in FleXam


 Select *m* consecutive packets out of every *k* consecutive packets, skipping the first δ



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Deterministic Sampling – Cont'd

- *m*=1: normal one out of *k* packets
- m>1, $k=\infty$: only the first m packets
 - Suitable for applications such as traffic classification
- $\delta > 0$: exclude short flows
 - Suitable for elephant flows



OpenFlow Specification

- New action: OFPAT_SAMPLING
 - Can be easily added to current OpenFlow implementations
 - No overhead for flows with no sampling
- Six parameters
 - scheme: which packet parts should be sent
 - m, k, and δ : deterministic sampling parameters
 - *p*: stochastic sampling parameter
 - destination: where should be sent to

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Switch Implementation

- Stochastic sampling:
 - Generate a random number
 - Select the packet if it is less than ρ
- Deterministic sampling:
 - Reuse Received Packets Counter
 - No need to new counter
 - Select packet if:

((Received_Packet_Counter- δ) % k)<m

• Both can be executed in the data path at line rate

Applications

- Various potential applications
 - Traffic classification
 - Quality of service
 - Diagnostics and troubleshooting
- In depth look at ...
 - Port scan detection; and
 - Elephant flow detection
- Accuracy vs. load trade-off

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Case Study: Port Scan Detection

- Example of FleXam used for security applications
- Threshold Random Walk algorithm
 - Assume the probability of a failed connection is
 - Relatively low for a benign host
 - High for attacker hosts
 - Maintaining an attacker likelihood ratio for each host
 - Increase it when a new connection fails
 - Decrease it when a new connection succeeds
 - Mark a connection successful if we observe
 - At least two packets from a UDP connection
 - A non TCP_SYN packet from a TCP connection

Evaluation Setup

- Developed an OpenFlow switch simulator
 - Provides an API similar to NOX
- Based on the dataset used by Mehdi et al. [2]
 - Separate attack and benign datasets
 - More details in the paper
- We created 20 different trials
 - Inserting the attack data at different times inside benign data

Effect of Sampling on Port Scan Detection

- Flow-shortening: only small fraction of flow packets are observed
 - Small flows: probably see only one packet
 - If only see SYN packet
 - Mark connection as failed
 - Decreases accuracy with false positives
- Flow-reduction: only some flows are observed
 - Uniform per-packet sampling
 - Miss many short flows, especially attack flows that are single packets
 - Miss some failed connections
 - Decreases accuracy with false negatives


Resolving Flow-Shortening Problem

- Receive a sampled packet from a new connection
 - TCP non SYN packet → mark connection as successful
 - UDP packet or TCP_SYN packet:
 - Ask the switch to send the next packet of this flow: Install an exact match flow rule with deterministic sampling with m=1 and $k=\infty$
 - If receive any packet later on, mark connection as successful
 - Otherwise, mark it as failed after a timeout

Resolving Flow-Reduction Problem

- Small number of flows carry most of the traffic
- In our traffic data:
 - Flows with more than 50 packets
 - 6% of total flows
 - Carry 96% of total packets
 - Carry 95% of total bytes
- Identify and exclude large (elephant) flows from sampling
 - Spend sampling budget on small flows

Resolving Flow-Reduction Problem




Elephant Flow Detection

- Sample all unknown traffic with a given rate of *P*
- Identify elephant flows
 - If more than ε samples received from a given flow
- Exclude elephant flows from sampling
 - Install an exact match flow rule to route them, without any sampling action

No need to complicated switch modifications

Network Overhead

- Overhead is low for a wide range of values
 - E.g. it is less than 0.4% for $\rho < 10$ and $\varepsilon < 10$




Accuracy

- Attack rates of 10, 100 and 1000 packets/s
 - All scanners were detected for any pairs of (ρ, ε)
- For 100% accuracy in other two cases:
 - (ρ =50%, ε =3) has overhead of 0.7% for an attack rate of 0.1 pps
 - (ρ = 5%, ε = 4) has overhead of 0.25% for an attack rate of 1 pps

Uniform Sampling Accuracy and Overhead

- Minimum sampling rate (and overhead) for 100% accuracy:
 - 60% for attack rate of 0.1 pps
 - 7% for an attack rate of 1 pps
 - 1% for higher attack rates (10, 100, and 1000 pps)



Overhead Comparison

Network overhead for 100% accuracy

| Method | Attack Rate | | | | |
|---|--------------|-------|------|------|------|
| | 0.1 | 1 | 10 | 100 | 1000 |
| Our Method | 0.7% | 0.25% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.5% |
| Uniform Sampling | 60% | 7% | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| Mehdi et al. [2] | 1.1% | 1.2% | 2% | 9% | 47% |
| Reactive OpenFlow Routing (No port scan detection) | 0. 7% | o.8% | 1.5% | 8.7% | 47% |

FleXam and Network Cost/Complexity

- In small networks
 - The controller could also be the monitoring device
 - Eliminating the need for a separate monitoring device
 - Significant reductions in cost and complexity
- For large networks
 - Samples can be directed to different monitoring devices
 - Reduce the load of monitoring devices by only sending the traffic they are interested in, and not all traffic
- Network overhead is tunable by the controller
 - Change parameters in real time, if needed

Conclusion

- Proposed FleXam
 - Flexible sampling extension for OpenFlow
 - Enables the controller to access packet-level information
 - Flexible for different applications
 - Yet simple enough to be implemented entirely in switch data-path and operate at line rate
- Demonstrated how to implement port scan detection with FleXam
 - An example of security applications that need access to packet-level information
- Other applications remain as future work

Thank You!

Questions?

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